Earlier this month, Cambodia and China inaugurated a joint logistics and training center at the Ream Naval Base, which is Beijing’s second publicly acknowledged overseas military facility after one in Djibouti. The Chinese-funded upgrades include a dry dock and a 650-meter pier capable of hosting warships of up to 20,000 metric tons, excluding only China’s largest aircraft carriers.
Strategically located on the Gulf of Thailand with direct access to the South China Sea, Ream is Cambodia’s only naval base with such reach. The project follows Cambodia’s 2020 demolition of a U.S.-built facility at the site and its rejection of Washington’s offer to repair it.
China portrays the expansion as part of its broader strategy to diversify maritime access and de-risk supply chains, allowing it to bypass regional chokepoints controlled by Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia. While Beijing and Phnom Penh claim that the base is intended solely for joint training, counter-terrorism, and humanitarian missions—not military expansion—the United States remains unconvinced.
The day after the inauguration, China and Cambodia launched the Golden Dragon 2025 joint naval exercises at the newly expanded Ream Naval Base. The drills, which included warship formation maneuvers and logistical training, utilized the newly completed facilities, demonstrating that the base is now fully operational and capable of supporting advanced military operations. Although Golden Dragon is not a new exercise, this iteration marks a turning point, serving as a public showcase of the base’s upgraded capabilities and the growing military alignment between China and Cambodia.
Chinese warships have maintained a persistent presence at Ream since at least 2023, and Beijing reportedly plans to transfer vessels to Cambodia while training local crews. The timing and scale of this year’s drills have heightened concerns over the base’s potential use by the People’s Liberation Army Navy. While previous exercises attracted little attention, this iteration marks Ream’s emergence as a platform for power projection, testing both the base’s operational readiness and the international response, particularly from the United States and ASEAN members.
Unlike China’s fully Chinese-operated base in Djibouti, Ream is presented as a joint venture, and Cambodia appears to be carefully managing perceptions. In a calculated act of diplomatic balancing, Cambodia invited the U.S. Navy to dock at Ream in December 2024. Most recently, two Japanese warships docked at Ream on April 19—the first foreign vessel to visit the upgraded facility. Japan, seen as a U.S. ally yet less provocative than the UK or Australia in the China–U.S. rivalry, offers Phnom Penh a way to signal neutrality without antagonizing Beijing.
Still, the timing of the Golden Dragon 2025 underscores Cambodia’s growing military alignment with Beijing. The government’s invitations to other navies, while aimed at projecting openness, have done little to calm fears in Washington or among ASEAN members, such as Vietnam and the Philippines. Many remain wary that Ream, despite official assurances, could function as a de facto Chinese permanent base.