Why Did the CCP’s HR Boss Get Swapped Out Overnight?

(L–R) Chinese Vice Premier Liu He, Vice Chairman of China's Central Military Commission Xu Qiliang, and Communist Party of China Central Committee Political Bureau member Li Ganjie attend the opening ceremony of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on March 4, 2023. Noel Celis/AFP via Getty Images

Commentary

In a surprising move that shocked China’s political elite, two high-ranking communist officials have swapped roles midway through their five-year terms—an unprecedented move in the history of the Chinese regime.

Li Ganjie, head of the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, has been replaced by Shi Taifeng, chief of the CCP’s United Front Work Department. Shi now runs the Organization Department, while Li has taken over the United Front.

Why replace the head of the Organization Department now, since the 20th National Congress of the CCP in 2022 solidified Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s team of policymakers?

The Li–Shi job swap is a significant event directly tied to Xi’s interests and authority.

A Fresh Blow to Xi’s Ability to Identify Talent

This reshuffle further undermines Xi’s ability to identify and retain loyal military personnel.

The Organization Department isn’t just a bureaucratic backwater—it’s the CCP’s central hub for selecting and placing senior officials in essential roles. Historically, that department had greater significance than China’s six traditional ministries: Ministry of Personnel, Ministry of Revenue, Ministry of Rites, Ministry of War, Ministry of Justice, and Ministry of Works. Today, it outranks other heavyweights under the CCP’s Central Committee, such as the Propaganda and United Front departments.

The position of Organization Department head serves as a well-known stepping stone to the Politburo Standing Committee. Notable examples include Hu Yaobang, Qiao Shi, Wei Jianxing, Song Ping, Zeng Qinghong, He Guoqiang, and Zhao Leji, all of whom advanced to high-ranking positions. For Xi, having control over this position is crucial, as it helps him maintain a network of loyalists within the highest levels of the Party. This position is so significant that Xi’s chosen ministers, including Li, are expected to play key roles in his political strategy.

At the CCP’s 20th National Congress in 2022, Xi, as the general secretary, handpicked the members of his team. Li’s appointment to head the Organization Department was widely viewed as supported by Chen Xi, a close confidant of Xi and a former member of the Politburo who had previously led the department himself.

Xi, Chen, and Li share a common link: All attended Tsinghua University. This strengthens Li’s connections within Xi’s Tsinghua clique. Li’s background, including his rise through Shandong Province—the home province of Xi’s wife, Peng Liyuan—to deputy governor, governor, and Party secretary, further reinforces this relationship.

After the 20th Congress, Xi appointed key officials, including Foreign Minister Qin Gang, Defense Minister Li Shangfu, and Li Ganjie. However, issues arose quickly. Qin, Xi’s youngest choice, was removed after just eight months, making him the shortest-serving foreign minister in the CCP’s history.

Li Shangfu, whom the United States had sanctioned, lasted only 10 months in his post before being ousted, setting a record as the shortest-serving defense minister. The downfall of Xi’s favored picks was not merely a setback; it dealt a significant blow to his authority.

Fast-forward to the present. Li Ganjie—another Xi protégé—has been moved to the United Front instead of being sacked outright. For Xi, this signifies yet another notable political setback.

Xi’s ‘Political Army-Building’ Hits Another Wall

Xi’s 13-year reign has hinged on one obsession: controlling the military.

His strategy, dubbed “political army-building,” involves stacking the armed forces with loyal generals to form a protective “Xi Family Army.”

Two figures were pivotal: Zhang Yang and Miao Hua, successive heads of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission.

Zhang’s tenure ended in 2017 when he committed suicide amid a corruption probe. The CCP posthumously expelled him, stripped him of his rank, and labeled him a corrupt individual who violated Party rules even after the 18th Congress.

Miao was promoted in August 2017, and two months later, he became a member of the Central Military Commission, a position he held until the 20th Congress. However, on Nov. 28, 2024, Defense Ministry spokesman Wu Qian announced that Miao was sidelined because of “serious disciplinary violations.”

As the military personnel czar for Xi, Miao selected top officers to ensure the smooth operation of the CCP leader’s military agenda. Miao’s downfall has led to speculation about a broader purge among senior military officials, with the CCP’s top disciplinary watchdog likely to label him as yet another corrupt individual.

Xi’s Top Military Ally Disappears—Another Setback

He Weidong, once seen as Xi’s top military protégé, recently vanished from the public eye. Although He was not a delegate at the 20th Congress, Xi recognized his potential and had been grooming him for greater influence. Breaking the CCP’s norms, Xi rapidly advanced He through three significant ranks, making him a member of the CCP Central Committee, a member of the Politburo, and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. No one else has experienced such a rapid ascent during Xi’s 13 years in power, earning He the nickname “Xi’s No. 1 Military Confidant.”

But whispers from overseas suggest that He was hauled off by the military’s Discipline Inspection Commission on March 11, 2025, the day the “Two Sessions” wrapped up. The Two Sessions refers to the annual meetings of China’s two key political bodies: the National People’s Congress—China’s rubber-stamp legislative body—and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, which is an advisory group for the CCP and the main part of the United Front Work Department.

He Weidong has disappeared from public view since then. He missed the “Anti-Secession Law” event on March 14, was not present with Xi for a troop meet-and-greet on March 20 in Kunming, and did not attend the annual Central Military Commission tree-planting photo op on April 2.

On March 25, The Washington Times cited U.S. defense officials confirming a political purge. On March 27, when asked about the matter, Defense Ministry spokesman Wu sidestepped the question, offering neither a denial nor a rebuttal.

If He fell from grace and Miao went down with him, then Xi’s military authority could be significantly weakened. The sudden departure of Li Ganjie from his position as head of the Organization Department—a crucial role in the CCP’s cadre selection system—threatens to undermine Xi’s control over important appointments, which could result in a potentially devastating setback.

A Sign of Xi’s Waning Power—or His Path to Exit?

In 2024, the CCP experienced significant turmoil. In April 2024, Xi’s top aide, Zhong Shaojun, was reassigned. In September 2024, Xi’s military enforcer, Chen Guoqiang, was also moved to another post. Additionally, three theater commanders were replaced, and in November 2024, Miao became the subject of an investigation.

Throughout late 2024, several of Xi’s appointees faced rumored probes, including Armed Police Force Chief Wang Chunning, Rocket Force Chief Wang Houbin, Eastern Theater Commander Lin Xiangyang, Navy Political Commissar Yuan Huazhi, and former Army Political Commissar Qin Shutong.

Xi’s authority has eroded since the third plenary session in July 2024. Reports have emerged suggesting that he suffered a stroke, leading to speculation that disillusioned CCP elders, frustrated with his handling of both domestic and foreign affairs, may have aligned with Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia for a “palace coup” to sideline the CCP leader.

That July, retired Renmin University professor Leng Jiefu penned an open letter to Zhang, posted online in August. He wrote that he had learned from discussions on WeChat that Xi was seriously ill, unable to work, and had delegated administrative and military duties to Zhang and others. Leng shared the letter with The Epoch Times on Aug. 11.

No fallout followed, suggesting that Xi was ill and Zhang assumed control, becoming the true power broker.

Conclusion

The sudden replacement of the head of the CCP’s Organization Department is a glaring sign that infighting has hit a boiling point since the 20th Congress.

The Li–Shi job swap signals that more significant developments in the CCP’s internal power struggles may be on the horizon.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.